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Dalit Politics in India
Recognition without Redistribution
Radha Sarkar, Amar Sarkar
Dalit political parties in North and 
Central India have overwhelmingly 
pursued an agenda of recognition, 
calling for equal respect, rather 
than one of redistribution. While 
this has improved the social and 
economic standing of Dalits better 
situated in terms of class, it has 
failed to substantively improve 
the lives of the majority of Dalits. 
Ultimately, Dalits’ quest for equal 
treatment will be limited so long 
as it lacks a redistributive politics 
that addresses exploitative 
economic relations.
How should we understand the rise of caste-based politics among India’s Dalits since the 1990s? 
Should we celebrate it as the empower-
ment of a historically oppressed commu-
nity and a major success of Indian dem o-
cracy, as some scholars have (Jaffrelot 
2003; Kohli 2001; Varshney 2000)? Or 
should we be more sceptical in examin-
ing the gains and limitations? 
We argue that caste-based politics 
cannot achieve social justice for Dalits 
unless it takes class into account, which 
it has largely failed to. The politics of 
recognition employed by Dalit parties 
has brought only limited gains for Dalits 
on the whole as the benefi ts associated 
with it have been reaped by Dalits better 
situated in terms of class. Ultimately, 
Dalits’ quest for equal treatment will be 
limited so long as it lacks a redistributive 
politics to address exploitative economic 
relations. We use the case of the Bahujan 
Samaj Party (BSP) in the northern state 
of Uttar Pradesh (UP)—one of the largest 
and most electorally successful of caste-
based parties—and its project for Dalit 
equality to illustrate our arguments. 
Social Justice
Nancy Fraser (1998) distinguishes two 
conceptions of social justice: one that 
centres on redistributive claims, com-
prising calls for a more equitable distri-
bution of goods and resources; and a 
second conception built on claims for 
recognition with the goal of a “difference-
friendly world” that accords equal respect 
to a plurality of social groups (Fraser 
1998: 1). While redistribution has had a 
central place in calls for justice, Fraser 
highlights the equal importance of rec-
ognition in achieving justice for those 
groups for whom “institutionalized 
patterns of interpretation and valuation 
[have] impede[d] the parity of participa-
tion in social life” (Fraser 1998: 4).
Fraser argues that to adequately add ress 
injustice, the politics of redistribution 
and recognition must be employed tog e-
ther: either one on its own is incapable 
of dealing with the complex cultural and 
economic realities of injustice. Her argu-
ment primarily concerns women but is 
also well suited to explain the nature of 
caste oppression in India. Caste, like 
gender in Fraser’s account, is a two-sided 
category, composed of economic and cul t-
ural dimensions. And as with gender, red-
r essing caste-based injustice calls for 
atten tion to both redistribution and 
 recognition (Fraser 1998: 2). 
Recognition vs Redistribution
Dalit political parties in Northern and 
Central India have emphasised a politics 
of recognition, even as they have margin-
alised a politics of redistribution, thereby 
precluding a fuller achievement of  justice. 
Such organisations and parties are based 
on, and articulate, demands for respect 
from others (Basu 2012; Weiner 2001). 
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previous draft.
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They are concerned  primarily with changes 
to the cultural order as means of securing 
equal treatment in social  relations, or, in 
Fraser’s words, they pursue “parity of par-
ticipation in social life” (1998: 4). 
But changes to the cultural order can 
at best address misrecognition, or the 
unfairly low social status accorded to a 
group; they are unable to address what 
Fraser terms maldistribution, or the un-
just distribution of resources and goods. 
If caste constituted the sole principle of 
distribution, then it would correspond 
perfectly with class. If all members of a 
caste engaged in their traditional occu-
pations, then we could expect few differ-
ences between property ownership, edu-
cation, wealth or income between the 
members of any one caste or sub-caste 
(Weiner 2001). Misrecognition of a gro u p’s 
status in society would directly entail 
maldistribution, and a politics of recog-
nition would serve to address injustices of 
distribution as well as recognition.
However, the reality of caste is more 
complex, for caste and class do not map 
seamlessly onto one another. With changes 
in economy and policy, caste Hindus as 
well as Dalits have become  increasingly 
differentiated internally. With deregula-
tion, liberalisation of the economy and 
higher economic growth rates, individu-
als from various rungs of the caste hier-
archy have gained diverse economic 
benefi ts (Weiner 2001; Kohli 2001). As 
some members of lower castes acquire 
higher levels of education and have ben-
efi ted from caste-based reservations in 
government employment, class divisions 
among them have increased. 
Weiner (2001) predicts an increasing 
trend of social mobility for educated, 
 urban Dalits; the prospects for the more 
numerous rural sections of the Dalit 
population, with less education, are less 
optimistic. Thus, all the members of any 
one caste do not belong to the same 
class: caste and class are not interchange-
able, and we cannot infer one directly 
from the other. Consequently, a politics 
of recognition does not, in and of itself, 
entail a politics of redistribution. 
In the remainder of this article, we 
demonstrate the ways in which the caste-
based politics of Dalit parties are unable 
to address the economic dimensions of 
oppression, in addition the cultural ones, 
for the overwhelming majority of Dalits.
The Case of Uttar Pradesh
Consider, for instance, the pro-Dalit BSP 
in UP. The BSP emerged as a competitor 
for state-level power in 1991, winning 
9.4% of the vote that year. In 2007, it 
won a landslide victory with 30.6% of 
the vote (Jeffrey et al 2008). The BSP’s 
attempts to better the social, economic, 
and political position of Dalits in UP 
comprised two interlinked strategies. 
The fi rst consisted in a symbolic trans-
formation of the landscape of UP—parks, 
statues, and libraries were dedicated to 
Dalit leaders; and hospitals, stadia, and 
educational institutions were renamed 
along similar lines (Jeffrey et al 2008). The 
BSP’s second strategy was to alter the 
implementation of existing government 
policies rather than effect new legislation 
(Chandra 2004). For exa m ple, the BSP 
sought to change the nature of the state 
government by transferring Dalits into key 
positions in the bureaucracy and by expan-
ding Dalit presence in the police force. In 
the six months that the BSP’s Mayawati 
was chief minister in 1997, she transferred 
1,350 civil and police offi cers (Jaffrelot 
2003: 419), made a concerted effort to 
recruit Dalits to the police force, and 
made existing  reserved seats in govern-
ment training and professional training 
more accessible to Dalits (Chandra 
2004; Hasan 2001). 
In sum, the strategy of the BSP was to 
raise the profi le of UP’s Dalits writ large 
by increasing their presence and power 
in the bureaucratic and coercive appara-
tuses, as well as in the symbolic landscape. 
Clearly, the BSP improved the political 
and economic standing of some Dalits. 
Varshney (2000) argues that, although 
the BSP has not substantially improved 
the economic position of ordinary Dalits, 
it has nonetheless benefi ted the Dalit 
community, politically and symbolically, 
across North India. He suggests that 
Dalits are better positioned to challenge 
the legitimacy of caste discrimination and 
to engage in politics. Jaffrelot (2003) goes 
further in suggesting that many ordinary 
Dalits are using their recently acquired 
state-level representation to signifi cantly 
improve their access to political resources, 
economic goods, and social contacts in 
rural UP. While the rise of low-caste 
 politics has indeed altered local-level 
politics to a certain extent (Jeffrey et al 
2008), hailing the BSP as the harbinger 
of a “silent revolution” (Jaffrelot 2003) is 
as yet premature, for a politics of recog-
nition, divorced from that of redistribu-
tion, is limited from the very outset. With-
out a radical shift in the distribution of 
economic and social opportunities, a poli-
tics of recognition does little to reconfi g-
ure entrenched power relations.
Socio-economic Inequality
The limits of a politics of recognition 
are evinced by the BSP. Even as it has 
em b r a ced a politics of recognition and 
advan ced a largely symbolic agenda, the 
BSP has failed to intervene in disputes 
over land and labour and to implement 
policies that address inequality and 
 poverty in UP (Jeffrey et al 2008). 
The realities of socio-economic inequ-
ality, rooted in unequal land and asset 
ownership, also impact the ways in 
which Dalits are able (or unable) to take 
advantage of the policies of recognition 
offered to them. While reservations in 
state educational institutions and gov-
ernment offi ces have been implemented 
with the claim of advancing Dalits’ eco-
nomic, political, and social standing, in 
reality they have done little for the 
 majority of the community. 
For instance, rural Chamars, a Dalit 
group in UP, argue that reservations have 
little impact on their community’s chances 
of securing government work because 
the competition for reserved government 
posts is fi erce and corrupt (Jeffrey et al 
2008). The Chamars’ less prestigious edu-
cation, obtained primarily from rural state 
schools with poor educational standards—
the only schools most Chamar families can 
afford—combined with a lack of money 
for bribes marginalised their bid for gov-
ernment jobs relative to urban members 
of their caste (Jeffrey et al 2008). The 
politics of recognition have thus allowed 
those Dalit individuals better positioned in 
the class hierarchy to take advantage of 
the opportunities offered for recognition. 
Furthermore, a politics of recognition 
without redistribution is limited even in 
its pursuit of respect in a largely rural 
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society where dignity and respect are 
bound up with landownership and use. 
Landownership has been a source of 
self-respect and a claim to respectful 
treatment from others across the Indian 
countryside (Bhatia 2005). For the major-
ity of rural Dalits, their landlessness has 
left them completely dependent on land-
lords. The skewed labour relations eng-
endered by this pattern of land owner-
ship has been a source of enduring 
 humiliation among Dalits and has exp o-
sed them to continued exploitation by 
their employers (Bhatia 2005). Respect 
for Dalits can only be meaningfully 
 secured through a direct intervention in 
the labour relations between them and 
other castes—either through land redis-
tribution, heightened minimum wage 
regulation, or other redistributive meas-
ures. The aim of a politics of recognition—
parity in participation in social life—can 
only be achieved with redistribution.   
All of this is not to deny the value of a 
politics of recognition. Dalits have been 
denied dignity and respect, even their 
humanity has too often been denied. 
These harms are indeed injustices of rec-
ognition and demand remedies of recog-
nition of equal worth. However, a Dalit 
politics of recognition that is unable to 
substantiate a redistributive agenda is 
doomed to be shallow, bringing tangible 
gains to those better off in class terms 
while permitting at best symbolic ach i e-
v e ments for many. 
Furthermore, such a politics ignores 
the interrelated nature of economic and 
social relations: without signifi cant redis-
tribution, Dalits are fated to continued 
dependence on higher castes to make 
ends meet. This economic dependence 
in turn fosters relations of exploitation 
that preclude the parity of participation 
in social life to which a politics of recog-
nition aspires. Indian democracy can only 
be (at most) a partial success without the 
full social and economic incorporation 
of the country’s most oppressed and 
marginalised groups. 
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